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Two years ago at this conference  I argued that the concentration of
market power in the United States was a malignant social problem that
was largely ignored by both the policy makers and the policy educators
of the day (Henderson). Indeed,  since then there have appeared many
signs of a growing tolerance  for market power. To quote a recent article
by  Michael  Porter,  the  highly  respected  professor  of  international
business at Harvard University, "Slowly  and almost imperceptibly...
America has been retreating  from one of the most fundamental  prin-
ciples that has distinguished  our nation from others; our faith in com-
petition ...  The words of the day are collaboration (and) relaxing anti-
trust regulations  . . ."  (1990A,  p.13).
Recently,  I  have turned  my attention  to the structure  and perfor-
mance of international markets. One theme that appears with some fre-
quency in the international market literature is, domestic concentration
of market power is not necessarily a bad thing; moreover, there is con-
siderable support for the argument that it is a good thing and should
be nurtured  as a matter of public policy.
My purposes herein are, first, to review the current state of knowledge
regarding  the impacts  of concentration  of market  power and related
dimensions  of industrial structure on market performance and social
welfare,  and second,  to explore how these impacts may change when
examined in a global market context. I'll draw, in part, on our ongoing
analysis of international market performance in the food manufactur-
ing industries. To preempt my analysis,  I intend to demonstrate that
globalization  does  not allow  us to  dismiss  concentration  of market
power from our list of legitimate  policy concerns.  In the end,  I hope
to provoke the policy education  community to deal head-on with the
"gold rule" - that is, the principle that those who have the gold, rule.
Industrial Structure and Economic  Performance
In brief, economic theory holds that the way in which industries and
markets  are structured  affects  the performance  of firms in those in-
dustries and thus the overall welfare of society. The best understood
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organization,  i.e.,  perfect competition  and perfect monopoly.  Market
power is absent in perfect competition  and wholly  concentrated in  a
perfect monopoly.
Microeconomic  theory demonstrates that perfect competition, when
universally obtained, leads  to Pareto optimal  social welfare.  That is,
there is no possible reallocation of goods or resources  in the economy
that can make one person better off without making someone else worse
off. By contrast, with equal certainty, monopoly results in deadweight
social loss from reduced production, higher prices and the reallocation
of economic surplus  from consumers to the monopolist.
In a legal context, it is the role of antitrust policy  to limit the  con-
centration of market power in order to assure that firms therein behave
more as if they are in a perfectly competitive industry than a monopoly.
While there is an argument in economic thought, known as the general
theory  of  second best (Lipsey  and  Lancaster),  as to whether  social
welfare is unambiguously  improved by removing one competitive  im-
perfection from a market if at least one other such imperfection exists,
antitrust policy  has rested on the principle  that high concentrations
of market power are not in the best interest of society. Justice William
0. Douglas put it well  when  he  wrote:  "Industrial power should  be
decentralized  so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent
on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability
of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but
respectable men is irrelevant"  (U.S. v.  Columbia  Steel).
In practice, it is well understood that most of the commercial world
is imperfectly competitive. That is, it falls somewhere between the two
"perfect"  extremes  of competition  and monopoly.  This is where con-
troversy over industrial structure policy is born. As Joseph Schumpeter
stated:  "The  unbroken  line  from  monopoly  to  competition  is  a
treacherous guide" (p. 981). Indeed, there is no single, generally received
explanation  of how economic  performance  and social  welfare change
as industry structure changes from one extreme of the competitive con-
tinuum to the other. In short, there is only one way to be perfect, but
many  ways to be imperfect.
Microeconomic theory includes numerous models of imperfect  com-
petition:  duopolies,  kinked  demand  oligopolies,  dominant  firm
oligopolies,  monopolistic competition  and the like.  However,  none  of
these  models  generate  sufficient  certainty  about  how firms  behave
under  imperfectly  competitive  conditions  to  allow  precise  and
unassailable predictions of market performance. As a result, proponents
of nearly any structural configuration  short of monopoly can muster
some not entirely irrefutable  logic in support of their position.
Industrial organization  is the specialized  branch  of microeconomic
theory that has been built up specifically to explain the behavior of im-
perfectly competitive  markets.  The old school of industrial organiza-
tion,  prevalent  through  the  1970s,  followed  the  structure-conduct-
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this school is replete with ad hoc econometric studies showing a variety
of statistically significant  relationships between various measures  of
imperfectly competitive market structure, dominated by seller concen-
tration, and various measures  of market performance,  dominated  by
price  levels  and profits.
A new school of industrial organization has been emerging since the
early 1980s (Tirole). The literature in this school includes specifications
of strategic firm behavior  in imperfectly competitive  markets,  and is
replete with such conceptual descriptions of strategic behaviors as non-
cooperative  games,  Cournot  competition,  Stackelberg  leaders,  and
Bertrand-Nash  pricing.
These empirical and theoretical variations  are all efforts to develop
a deterministic understanding of how the "real world" of imperfect com-
petition relates to economic performance and social welfare. While pro-
gress  has  been made,  efforts  still  fall somewhat  short of the deter-
ministic objective.  The new industrial economics  teaches us that old
school ad hoc econometric  models of imperfectly competitive markets
that do not include structural equations of price and quantity behavior
are misspecified and thus may yield unreliable results. Yet, despite ad-
vances in the application of game theory to firm behavior, unambiguous
specification of changes in a firm's price and output decisions in reac-
tion to strategic moves by its rivals is not yet an accomplished task.
Until  such behavior  can  be  estimated  reliably,  obtaining  unbiased
evidence  of the relationship  between  structural variables  - such  as
market power  - and market performance  variables  - such as price-
cost margins  - will be elusive.
Nonetheless,  many  useful  insights  have  been  gained.  Richard
Schmalensee  recently assessed more than 250 published results from
interindustry  (cross sectional)  econometric  studies that reported em-
pirical findings on structure-performance  relationships in imperfectly
competitive industries. Based upon this comprehensive  review, he con-
cluded that such studies  ". . . rarely if ever yield consistent estimates
of structural parameters, but they can produce useful stylized facts ... "
(p.  952).
Given the potential for econometric misspecification that is inherent
in such studies, the lack  of consistent parameter estimates is  hardly
surprising. What is impressive,  however, is that the collection of studies
persuaded a scholar of Schmalensee's  stature that empirical regularities
do exist in the relationship between industry structure and economic
performance.  He states such empirical regularities as stylized facts, e.g.,
"In cross-section  comparisons involving markets in the same industry,
seller concentration is positively related to the level of price"  (p. 988).
In another exceptionally  ambitious empirical analysis, Leonard Weiss
and his  colleagues reexamined  121  industry data sets that had been
used  in  econometric  studies  of the  concentration-price  relationship.
Positive correlations between seller concentration and price levels were
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4 were  statistically  significant.  Generalizing  across all  121 data sets
revealed an average price increase of 3.3 percent associated with a 10
percent increase in the three-firm concentration ratio (CR3). In summing
up, Weiss  states:  ".  . . evidence that concentration is correlated  with
price  is overwhelming"  (p. 283).
Even so, Weiss was not able to find unambiguous empirical evidence
of  a  generalized  functional  relationship  between  concentration  and
prices, concluding,  "Our evidence on functional form is so diverse that
we cannot justify  any one oligopoly theory over the others"  (p. 283).
The  lack  of  solid  empirical  findings  on  functional  form is  further
evidence of specification problems that result from the absence of a good
estimate  of imperfectly  competitive  behavior.
Weiss did observe, however, that concentration seems to make little
difference on price levels when the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4)
is below  50 percent.  From this he  suggests that an empirical  search
for a critical concentration ratio (CCR) might bear fruit in terms of iden-
tifying a threshold level of market power below which undesirable per-
formance implications  are inconsequential. While no such search has
yet been reported, the practical appeal of such a threshold for enforce-
ment  of antitrust policy is  obvious.
Empirical work following the dictates of the new industrial organiza-
tion school has also begun to emerge. This is conceptually  attractive
because data from single industries are used to estimate a system of
structural equations that is derived from a clearly specified  firm-level
optimization problem. That is, this approach includes behavioral equa-
tions by which firms determine price and quantity. As such, parameter
estimates can be tested against values with explicit economic interpreta-
tions, e.g., infinite price elasticity of demand equates with perfect com-
petition. As such, this work represents  an important step in removing
ambiguity  associated with potential  specification  error.  However,  in
order to confine strategic behavior  to that which can be represented
in behavioral  equations, these tend to be intraindustry studies. While
this is an advantage methodologically, it also puts some limits on how
broadly the findings can be generalized.
We are indebted to Timothy Bresnahan for a review of new empirical
industrial organization research.  He found twelve intraindustry studies
from which conclusions  could be drawn regarding empirical relation-
ships between market power and price-cost margins (PCMs). While con-
centration ratios were not available because panel data on firms were
used as points of observation rather than industry census data, in all
cases the industries examined appear to be from the highly concentrated
end  of  the  market  structure  spectrum:  food  processing,  tobacco
manufacturing,  electrical machinery,  automobiles and gasoline retail-
ing as examples. PCMs ranged from 2.5 percent of costs for the second
largest  coffee  roasting  firm  to  88  percent  for  large  banks  prior  to
deregulation,  and averaged  29.5 percent across sixteen observations.
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has been learned so far from the new methods about market power and
industrial structure, (2)  one significant cause of high price-cost margins
is collusive market behavior,  and (3) some concentrated  industries ex-
ercise a great deal of market power, resulting in high price-cost margins
(pp.  1052-3). Given the relatively recent attention to empirical analysis
in the new school, the first conclusion is hardly surprising. The second
and third seem to be validations of the general although imprecise con-
clusions drawn from a couple decades of empirical work in the old school.
Furthermore, about the new studies Bresnahan states, "the individual
studies of particular  industries are specific and detailed enough that
alternative  explanations  of the findings  can be rebutted"  (p.  1053).
The  Anti-Antitrust Movement
Despite convincing theoretical  and empirical evidence  that concen-
tration of market power works to the detriment of the social good, in
the 100 years since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act there
have been a number of anti-antitrust movements in the United States.
The first concerted attack came in the 1920s when President Coolidge
appointed  a lobbyist for western lumber interests,  William E.  Hum-
phrey,  as  chairman  of the Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC).  Under
Humphrey's guidance, the FTC changed from a role for "the preserva-
tion of fair methods of competition  ...  into a device for limiting price
competition itself"  (Fainsod and Gordon,  p.  520).
A resurgence  of antitrust  policy following  World War II  began  to
crumble during the events leading to Watergate. The direction was set
by President Nixon's instructions to Deputy Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst regarding the Justice Department's challenge  to the pend-
ing merger between ITT and the Grinnell Corporation. The president's
message was recorded by a secretly installed tape recorder,  to wit, "...
my order is to drop the God damn thing. Is that clear?"  (as quoted in
Mueller,  p. 7).  The virtual decimation of antitrust enforcement  during
the 1980s reflected  the Reagan  administration's  views,  as succinctly
put by OMB Director David Stockman, "I  disagree with the whole anti-
trust tradition"  (Village Voice).
Until the recent emergence  of literature  on industrial  organization
and international trade, there were two principal attempts to bring in-
tellectual respectability to concentrations of market power - the con-
cept of countervailing power,  and the theory of contestable markets.
I discussed - and dismissed - both of these concepts  in my remarks
two years ago, so I will offer only a brief reiteration here. Countervail-
ing power was put forward in 1952 by J. Kenneth Galbraith in his first
major book on industrial structure, American Capitalism, as an explana-
tion of how the market power of one large corporation may offset that
of another. However, by the time Galbraith published his more critical
book on the organization  of the industrial sector,  The New Industrial
State,  in  1967,  he  had  dropped  that  notion  entirely.  Indeed,
microeconomic theory well demonstrates that about the only industrial
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a unilateral monopoly is a bilateral monopoly.
The  concept  of contestable  markets  was put forward  in the early
1980s  by William Baumol and his colleagues.  The essence of the idea
is that firms with concentrated  market power will act as if they had
none in the absence of barriers to keep potential competitors out of their
market. Contestability theory quickly generated a sizeable following,
in part because of its obvious appeal to the critics of antitrust policy
and  in  part  because  it  generates  specific  conclusions  that  lend
themselves to testing. And it is in the testing where the most telling
damage to the concept resides. Gilbert recently reviewed  a number of
experimental  studies  of contestability  from which he concluded that
"... prices are controlled by actual  entry, not by the threat of poten-
tial entry" (p.  116, emphasis  added).
Another defense of concentrated  market power has been advanced
by  the proponents  of  corporate  takeovers.  A  prominent  theory  of
takeovers is that well-run companies acquire poorly-run companies and
improve their performance.  Empirical evidence, however, is to the con-
trary. Michael Salinger has just published a comprehensive review of
the merger  literature.  He found no evidence  of improved efficiencies
from takeovers  and significant evidence  that the performance of ac-
quiring  firms declines in the years following  mergers.  Salinger  con-
cludes, "there should be a strong presumption that mergers violating
the concentration  standards  in the merger guidelines are illegal,  and
merging parties should bear a strong burden of proof that efficiencies
justify  overturning that presumption"  (p.  320).
Despite my dismissal of attempts to bring respectability to the con-
cept of concentrated  markets, and much more eloquent expose of the
anti-antitrust movement by others (see Mueller for example), defenders
of market power appear to be unconvinced. Just weeks ago, for example,
Jens Knutson, director of economic research  for the American Meat
Institute, said of the beef processing industry,  where the four leading
firms have gained more than 80 percent of the market in recent years
(Ward, p.  15),  there is "solid economic evidence ...  that producers and
cattle feeders have received tangible price benefits ...  There is equally
compelling evidence that consumers, too, have benefitted...  from lower
prices ..  ."  (AMI Newsletter).
Globalization  of  Markets
Defenders of concentrated market power have found some new solace
in the phenomenon of market globalization.  The intuitive appeal of one
line of reasoning is straight-forward:  given the possibility of interna-
tional trade we do not need to be concerned about the exercise of market
power in concentrated  markets because of the competitive threat from
foreign firms.
In the absence of actual imports, this argument is no more valid than
contestability  theory - essentially it is simply  an extension of con-
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present, they do have a procompetitive effect on market performance.
Indeed, econometric  studies of prices and price-cost margins routinely
find that both are negatively related to levels of important penetration,
and that the negative effect  is more prounounced  as domestic  seller
concentration  increases  (Esposito  and Esposito;  Pugel).
Recent years have seen  an integration between  international trade
and industrial organization theories. While this merger of theories had
its roots in the desire to explain bilateral international trade in similar
goods, or what has come to be known as intra-industry trade (see Dixit
and Norman,  and  Sheldon,  for example), it has been extended  to the
assessment of strategic interdependent  behavior  in imperfectly  com-
petitive international markets. It is this theoretical interface that has
also provided the conceptual underpinnings for our current World Food
Systems  research  initiative  (organized  as  regional  research  project
NC-194).
One outcome of the integration between industrial organization and
international trade has been the application of considerable intellectual
effort to a defense of policies that enhance market power. This has come
to be referred to as strategic trade policy. In brief,  the strategic trade
policy  argument  begins with the observation  that, in a world  of im-
perfect competition, a lucky firm can earn excess profits if other firms
are dissuaded  from entering the market. A country can, accordingly,
raise  its national  income  at the expense  of other  countries  if it  can
somehow ensure that the lucky firm is domestic rather than foreign.
In two highly influential papers,  Brander and Spencer demonstrated
theoretically that government policies such as export subsidies and im-
port restrictions can preclude foreign firms from competing for lucrative
markets  in  industries  that  are  characterized  by  significant  scale
economies and thus increase national income. In essence, these policies
are used to enhance the market power of domestic firms, the purpose
being to enable them to shift excess profits away  from foreign firms.
For sake of clarity regarding a fairly unconventional  economic  con-
cept, permit me to recreate a stylized example (this draws heavily on
Krugman, 1987). Assume there are only two countries, let's call them
the United States and Europe, each with one firm, called Boeing and
Airbus, that can produce a product, called wide-body passenger aircraft,
for sale in the global market. Assume that demand and production costs
are such that if either firm produces the product, it will earn profits
of 100  (call it millions  of dollars). But if both produce  and share the
market, each will lose 5. Left alone,  the firm with  a head start would
become the sole producer.  Assume this is Airbus. Boeing will not pro-
duce and U.S earnings  are 0. Now suppose that the U.S. government
commits to pay a subsidy of 10 to Boeing regardless of what Airbus
does. This means that Boeing will earn profits of 5 even if Airbus also
produces, but Airbus will lose 5 for doing so. Thus, Airbus is induced
not to produce. The result is, a U.S. subsidy of just 10 raises the pro-
146fits ot the U.S.  firm from  0 to  110.
In this example,  100 represents the transfer of national income from
Europe to the United States brought about by a U.S. policy of reduc-
ing competition or increasing market power. In part because the idea
appeals to the baser instincts of national greed, strategic trade policy
has gained a following among many policy makers. In part because the
Brander and Spencer proof uses the highly sophisticated mathematics
that some economists  find erotic,  and in part because it has the ap-
pearance of being a tractable counterpoint to competition and free trade,
it has also gained  the interest of many economists.
However,  it may be  a trivial  concept.  That is,  the circumstances
necessary  to produce the Brander and Spencer results may so seldom
exist in the real world that it has no practical application. Most of the
analysis of strategic trade policy to date has been  theoretical;  a few
studies are just now emerging that attempt to produce quantifiable
results by calibrating conceptual models to data from actual industries.
Krugman (1989) reviewed much of this work and found little support
of either  a theoretical or quantitative nature,  at one point concluding
that, "The government would have been better off if it had never heard
of Brander and  Spencer,  or had a constitutional  prohibition against
listening  to them"  (p.  1206).
Does this mean, then, that market globalization  has nothing to teach
us regarding the desirability of concentrated market power, or the lack
thereof?  To the contrary,  a growing  body of literature,  granted more
empirical than theoretical at this point, demonstrates that international
market performance  is positively related to competition and negatively
related to concentrated  market power.
In what  I believe history will treat as a seminal works on industry
structure and international  markets, Michael Porter draws on a four-
year study of more than one hundred industries in ten industrialized
countries to formulate general postulates on factors that influence in-
dustrial performance in a global context (1990B).  These ten countries
- the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Switzerland,  Sweden,
Singapore, Korea, Japan, Italy, Germany and Denmark - account for
fully 50 percent of all world trade, and the focus of Porter's study was
on determinants  of international competitive  advantage.
The  Porter  study  is  too  comprehensive  to  summarize  in  a  few
sentences here, and I prescribe the entire 855-page text for the top of
your  "must read" list.  In essence,  he found that in every nation, the
industries that perform best in international markets are those in which
there are a number of able local competitors that pressure one another
to advance.  That is, domestic industries without highly concentrated
market power  are the most successful in terms of penetrating global
markets  - not only in the United States but elsewhere. He concludes,
"This study, in a way I could not anticipate, has led me to a conviction
that incentives, effort, perseverance,  innovation and especially competi-
tion are the source of economic progress in any nation  and the basis
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In some of the early work done in the World Food Systems research
project,  Stuart  Frank  and  I  have  examined  how  the  international
market performance  of U.S. food manufacturers is affected by industrial
organization  (Henderson  and Frank).  With export propensity  as our
dependent variable, that is, exports  as a share of total shipments,  or-
dinary least squares regression  was used to estimate  the impacts  of
industry structure on export market performance.  We used 1982 cross-
sectional data on forty-two food manufacturing industries defined at
the 4-digit SIC level, drawn primarily from the U.S. Census of Manufac-
turers.  Our explanatory  variables  included  seller concentration  as  a
measure of market power, and other variables representing product dif-
ferentiation,  scale  economies,  and entry  barriers.
Our findings are consistent with Porter's less quantitative but more
extensive analysis.  In highly robust regression results that explained
more than 85 percent of the interindustry performance variability in
the export market  for processed food, we found a statistically  signifi-
cant  negative  relationship  between market  power  in domestic  food
manufacturing industries  and export propensity.  Specifically,  export
propensity declined by 4.9 percent for a 10 percent increase in market
power as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman  (HH150) Index. Using
the 4-firm concentration ratio yielded similar but somewhat less robust
results.
Conclusions  and Implications
The available evidence, both theoretical and empirical, strongly sup-
ports the conclusion  that seller concentration  and market  power  are
negatively related to global, as well as domestic, market performance
and economic welfare. That is, competition helps, and more is preferable
to less,  be the market local,  regional, national or global.
The implications  are clear.  A strong antitrust policy is essential to
upgrading the economic welfare  of society.  Leniency toward mergers
is  a trap.  Leniency  toward cartels,  alliances  and industrial  combines
is also a trap. The national champion theory, or the idea that domestic
firms will be more efficient if they merge into one or two large national
competitors, fails the tests of both logic and history. Regulations that
protect existing firms and that restrict the entry of new firms into a
market  must  be  vigorously  resisted.  By contrast,  policies  that  en-
courage active domestic competition should be nurtured and coveted.
Why, then, is the policy battle still joined by proponents  of market
power? Robert Baldwin, writing on the political economy of trade policy,
offers  keen  insight:  "In  fact,  economic  self-interest  almost  always
dominates a person's concern for the welfare of other groups or the na-
tion as a whole, when a significant part of an individual's income is af-
fected by a trade policy"  (p. 130).  That statement is equally relevant
for domestic industrial structure policy,  and all other policies in which
the income  of a few holds  hostage the interests  of the many.
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